Defending A Mixed Economy by Hovenkamp, Herbert J.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
5-9-2016 
Defending A Mixed Economy 
Herbert J. Hovenkamp 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the American Politics Commons, Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, 
Law and Politics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons, 
and the Political Economy Commons 
Repository Citation 
Hovenkamp, Herbert J., "Defending A Mixed Economy" (2016). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1767. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1767 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 





Defending a Mixed Economy 
By HERBERT HOVENKAMP 
Review of American Amnesia: How the War on 
Government Led Us to Forget What Made America 
Prosper, by Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson 
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016 
 
American Amnesia is a readable, somewhat breezy history of the Republican 
Party’s war on government, written by two prominent political scientists. Their 
book, which focuses mainly on the 1980s and after, is not quite what the title 
conjures. One might expect an historical assessment of the role of the State in 
American economic policy and how the war on government lost sight of that 
history. A bit of that appears at the beginning, but not very much. Most of 
Hacker’s and Pierson’s book is a heavily factual account of the interest groups and 
money power behind the Republican Party from President Reagan forward, 
focusing on interest groups and politics rather than theory. This is good and 
interesting reading nonetheless. 
Hacker and Pierson begin with a very brief effort to dismantle the idea that the 
Founding Fathers, James Madison in particular, were radical anti-government 
activists and that the Constitution reflected that judgment. Rather, they argue, the 
Constitution contemplated a partnership between markets and government, and one 
in which the government played a strong and essential part. My own reaction to 
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this opening discussion was twofold. First, the authors examined very little from 
the historiography, text, or early interpretation of the Constitution in order to prove 
their point. They did emphasize the extent to which the Constitution was a reaction 
to the weak, unworkable government contemplated by the Articles of 
Confederation. Beyond that, their principal discussion concerns a collection of 
statements from James Madison, showing that Madison was not nearly as laissez 
faire about the role of government in the economy as some people have thought, 
most particularly George Will. There is no treatment of the Constitution’s conferral 
of significant power to both Congress and the Executive branch, no mention of 
Chief Justice Marshall’s influential jurisprudence that consolidated and 
strengthened federal power while subordinating the role of the states. Also absent 
is any treatment of the early national federal and state governments’ very 
considerable public support for the development of infrastructure, with devices 
ranging from lottery financing to private monopoly grants. Nor do the authors 
consider the much more laissez faire reaction that took hold only in the 1820s with 
the rise of the Jacksonian movement. Their only reference to Jackson concerns his 
abolition of the National Bank, on which they blame a series of panics that 
stretched across the balance of the nineteenth century. They do briefly defend the 
Progressive Era, particularly its drive to expand both voter participation and 
government involvement in the economy. 
My second reaction, however, is that Hacker and Pierson are precisely correct even 
though they did not document their historical conclusions particularly well. Indeed, 
one could go a step further: the extent to which some conservatives and libertarians 
have attempted to rewrite constitutional history in order to make antigovernment 
laissez faire a significant part of our constitutional past is nothing short of 
embarrassing. The original United States Constitution and contemporaneous state 
constitutions all contemplated governments that were heavily involved in 
economic development. Further, while the United States Constitution including the 
First Amendment very largely kept the national government out of the business of 
favoring or supporting particular religions, contemporaneous state constitutions 
showed no such reticence. For example, most of them insisted that only Christians 
could hold public office, and several extended that privilege only to Protestants. 
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Many also permitted individual states to use tax monies to support established 
churches. 
Further, at no time in our constitutional history has the prevailing view of 
government at either the federal or the state level been predominantly libertarian. 
The period from Andrew Jackson to the Progressive Era witnessed a significant but 
only partially successful effort to push the government out of the economy. But the 
Jacksonian Era was characterized by even greater enthusiasm for public regulation 
of morals, including relatively victimless crimes such as Sabbath breaking or 
blasphemy – things that laissez faire constitutional law writers such as Thomas M. 
Cooley, John H. Dillon, and Christopher Tiedeman supported even as they decried 
state economic regulation. 
So Hacker and Pierson are exactly right on the proposition suggested by their title: 
the War on Government today is based on a “collective amnesia” about American 
economic policy. Perhaps “willful ignorance” would be a better term. In any event, 
the evidence is sufficient to make clear that, notwithstanding its rhetoric, the war 
on government is in no sense a return to either constitutional or public policy 
originalism. 
The bulk of Hacker’s and Pierson’s book is not concerned with the earlier history 
of economic policy, but rather with the various political maneuvers and interest 
group realignments that developed out of the “stagflation” crisis often attributed to 
President Jimmy Carter. The term refers to a combination of inflation and 
economic stagnation, or slow growth. Conservative contemporary critics quickly 
identified the culprit as an American policy developed after World War II of using 
active government management to maintain full employment. In retrospect, Hacker 
and Pierson note, stagflation seems much less mysterious than it appeared to be at 
the time. It was occasioned mainly by the 1973-1974 oil embargo during the Nixon 
years, simultaneously producing both slow growth and increasing costs. American 
policy up to that time had become far too dependent on foreign oil, which was 
essential to American production, and the embargo brought these vulnerabilities 
home. They might also have noted that although the word “stagflation” suggests a 
flatlining economy, in fact Reagan’s rhetoric about achieving growth by getting the 
government off Americans’ back was much more potent than the reality. Indeed, in 
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retrospect growth during the years leading up to Reagan was not bad. The oil crisis 
took its toll, but mainly during the Nixon-Ford years. Measured by adjusted GDP 
per capita, growth during the twelve Reagan/Bush years was in fact quite 
mediocre, embarrassed by the eight high growth Kennedy/Johnson years which 
preceded it, handily bested by both Clinton administrations, and even bettered by 
the Carter administration whom Reagan Republicans denigrated. Differences in job 
creation performance are even more dramatic. 
As economic performance numbers indicate, the collective American Amnesia to 
which Hacker and Pierson refer is forgetfulness about the fact that the United 
States has a mixed economy, and over the long run that combination of private 
markets and public oversight has served us very well. Rather than the invisible 
hand, they develop Charles Lindblom’s metaphor of a hand in which markets are 
the fingers and government is the thumb. The fingers alone have dexterity but lack 
power. The thumb alone has power and can add stability, but it lacks the ability to 
grasp and lever. Working together, however, the thumbs and fingers are able to 
achieve far more than any part of the hand acting alone. At risk of being trite, the 
whole hand is very much more than a sum of its parts. 
As Hacker and Pierson repeatedly emphasize, one characteristic of the revolt 
against government was a shift of resources away from production and toward 
finance. Accompanying this substantial growth in financial transactions was a 
steep decline in investment in infrastructure, basic research, and education. To be 
sure, investment in infrastructure has its share of rent seeking – for example, 
Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens’ Bridge to Nowhere. But finance has more than its 
share as well, a phenomenon that they trace all the way back to railroad financier 
Jay Gould during the Gilded Age. As they put it, “Gould ignored the mechanics of 
rail and focused on the money.” Indeed, the authors see the deregulation of 
finance, the slashing of the highest marginal tax rates, and the upward spiral of 
executive pay all as elements of serious problems: maldistribution of wealth, 
poorer economic performance, and slower economic growth. We devote too many 
resources to pushing money around and not enough to building things. 
The rise of the Chicago School, particularly its macroeconomics, also plays a 
prominent part in this account. The Hacker and Pierson presentation is somewhat 
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caricatured, however, presenting the School largely as a manifesto for smaller 
government and ignoring most of its significant contributions. The anecdotes are 
nevertheless interesting. For example, Hacker and Pierson tell a story about how 
the first ten editions of Paul Samuelson’s best-selling undergraduate 
textbookEconomics started out as Keynesian in its macro policy. Later editions 
gradually moved away from Keynes, however, as Samuelson aligned himself with 
more neoclassical Chicago School macroeconomics. The authors attribute this 
migration to harsh criticism from William F. Buckley, Jr., Milton Friedman, 
George H. Stigler and other unnamed Chicago School macroeconomists. This 
criticism seems overblown, for two reasons. First, Samuelson’s (and later William 
Nordhaus’)Economics was a basic introductory text, and basic texts are expected to 
follow the leading theory of the day. Samuelson’s movement is equally well 
explained by the very considerable shift in macroeconomic theory reflected by the 
demise of traditional Keynesianism, the collapse of Bretton Woods monetary 
policy, and a little later the stagflation crisis. The new theory reintroduced 
neoclassical price theory into macro. Quite aside from negative reviews, a 
responsible author of an undergraduate text in Samuelson’s position would have 
reflected the changes. 
Second, on this particular issue a stronger case can be made that it was Keynes 
who was the historical outlier, with his broad rejection of self-clearing markets and 
full employment equilibrium, as well as his belief in temporary deficit spending in 
order to stimulate labor. It is worth remembering that the federal government 
neverintentionally produced annualized deficit budgets prior to the Second New 
Deal. Keynesian theory certainly did not harken back to the Constitutional or 
Jacksonian periods. Through most of the classical period up to the Progressive Era, 
economists generally believed that most markets cleared at efficient levels of 
output. In fact, aside from a few extreme cases of natural monopoly, most of our 
theories of market failure were created during the period from 1890 to 1935, with 
the incorporation into microeconomic models of fixed costs and product 
differentiation. On this point, Keynes did little more than share a belief, together 
with the microeconomists of his generation (mainly Robinson and Chamberlin), 
that market failure was more common than had previously been appreciated. 
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Nevertheless, when it was published in 1936 the General Theory took economics 
and policy making by storm, caught Roosevelt’s attention, and became a central 
symbol of the Second New Deal. Prior to that time and all the way back through 
the nineteenth century American monetary and employment policy were more 
classical or neoclassical. Indeed, prior to the New Deal management of 
employment was not a concern of federal policy at all, and the states did little more 
than attempt to regulate wages and working conditions. 
As any good story, Hacker and Pierson’s book has its share of villains. Most 
prominent are Charles and David Koch and the various foundations and centers 
that they have financed. All are dedicated to the promotion of libertarian policies, 
supportive of deregulation, and particularly hostile toward increased taxes. “Fewer 
groups have assembled more resources or amassed more power … and few have 
done more to shape the world we occupy today.” They suggest that the Kochs 
might have been even more influential except for their insistence on excessive 
downstream control. For example, while other foundations typically funded 
academic and research projects without regard to ideology, the Koch Foundations 
was highly selective and often becoming involved in post-grant management. Their 
Club for Growth, ironically, has fueled policies that have actually retarded 
economic growth, although they did redistribute more wealth. Hacker and Pierson 
describe the Club for Growth’s influence by giving an account of a Fox News 
Republican presidential debate in Iowa in 2011, in which all eight candidates stated 
that they would walk away from a deal that promised massive spending cuts if it 
also included even modest tax increases. I find it hard to believe that the Kochs 
have had as much influence on the Republican right as Hacker and Pierson 
suggest, but the facts are powerful. 
Another villain that appears prominently is Ayn Rand, the Russian-born libertarian 
author of The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged. When she did most of her writing 
in the 1940s and 1950s she was regarded as something of a quack, but later she 
became a darling author of more libertarian republicans. One interesting episode 
concerns the Koch brothers’ heavy involvement in the Cato Institute, including 
their role in selecting an Ayn Rand disciple as its head. Interestingly, Ayn Rand’s 
own well documented preoccupation with the Soviet Union and the cold war was 
not what fueled post-Reagan anti-statism. To the contrary, Hacker and Pierson 
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suggest that a bigger factor was the end of the cold war and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The resulting vacuum reduced the pressure on the United States to 
compete. Before that, the perceived Soviet threat induced a significant investment 
in infrastructure and R & D, including public funding for a national highway 
system, massive increases in education funding, dam construction including the 
Saint Lawrence Seaway, and the establishment of NASA and a national space 
program. The irony is that the current policies of the Republican right are 
significantly a result of lack of competition. 
One group that is very largely absent from Hacker’s and Pierson’s account are 
Christian evangelicals, who have made up an important component of the 
Republican base since the Reagan years. In their picture, which seems 
fundamentally accurate, when the right gets around to talking about tax policy, 
privatization of the economy, or deregulation, Christian evangelicals are simply 
not at the table. As they conclude, “The tight alliance of conservative Christian 
voters and the GOP … has given the top a substantial base of middle-income 
voters who side with the party mostly for noneconomic reasons.” Because of 
parallel Republican commitments to evangelical positions on abortion, gay 
marriage and similar issues the Party has had “greater freedom to head right on 
economic issues without worrying as much about the electoral support of their 
least-well-off backers.” The irony, as Hacker and Pierson tell it, is that not only do 
evangelicals vote contrary to their own independent economic interest, but they 
also produce high turnouts, consistently greater than nearly all Democratic party 
groups. It’s a twisted picture, of a group voting against most of their own economic 
interests, and at very high turnout levels, because they are aligned with the 
Republican right’s other views. 
My own belief is that this story is a little more complicated than Hacker and 
Pierson present it. The Party has not been able to field a true conservative or 
libertarian presidential candidate since the Goldwater debacle in 1964, although 
that may repeat in 2016. Reagan produced plenty of adorable rhetoric but his 
policies overall were quite moderate by comparison. The two Bushes came a little 
closer, but both McCain and Romney were at least closet moderates whose 
conservative credentials were often in doubt. In sum, the message is more mixed 
than the authors portray. 
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Hacker’s and Pierson’s larger point seems spot on, however. The brand of 
conservatism or libertarianism that has captured the Republican Party over the past 
three decades has not been a success, has been found out, has done serious 
damages to the Republican Party, and has very likely run its course, particularly 
given a younger generation that is less religious, more socially tolerant, and 
generally more to the left on economic issues. The move to the right has simply not 
lived up to expectations. Economically, it has significantly underperformed the 
more interventionist policies that preceded it. Its antigovernment rhetoric is both 
divisive and counterproductive for anyone who believes that economic growth can 
and must lift all boats. As they note in conclusion, over American history the 
“mixed economy remains a spectacular achievement” producing “unprecedented 
prosperity.” Indeed, the antigovernment movement that has captured the 
Republican party today will likely be viewed as one of the greatest and most 
spectacular instances of special interest rent-seeking in history. 
Posted on 9 May 2016 
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